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Reconsidering Dual Agency Conflicts in 
Residential Real Estate 
SAMUEL BAYER† 
California has long permitted dual agency representation in residential real estate transactions, 
and consumers have long maligned the practice as presenting an unavoidable conflict of interest.1 
However, dual agency provides benefit to consumers in some situations, and those benefits are 
often overlooked by those who seek to prevent it altogether. Recent statutory changes in California 
and other states have attempted to resolve dual agency conflicts of interest while allowing the 
practice to continue (at least in some form). However, these attempts have largely failed to quell 
consumer frustrations due to a few fundamental miscommunications between consumers and 
legislators. By clarifying how consumers understand terms like “real estate agent” and “dual 
agency,” and by analyzing and compiling various statutory schemes in states across the country, 
California legislators may be able to rectify the situation, enacting statutory changes that finally 
resolve consumer frustrations without abolishing dual agency altogether. 
  
 
 † Recent graduate of the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, Class of 2020, and a 
licensed real estate agent in California. The Author would like to thank Professor Abraham Cable for his 
guidance in preparing this Note. For questions or comments regarding this Note, please contact Samuel at 
bayer@uchastings.edu.   
 1. See Michael Drouillard, A Critique of the British Columbia Residential Real Estate Brokerage 
Industry’s Use of Dual Agency, 16 APPEAL: REV. CURRENT L. & L. REFORM 84, 89 (2011). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a traditional residential real estate transaction (a “single agency” 
transaction), a buyer and seller are each represented by their respective real 
estate broker (“Broker”), who acts as his or her client’s personal representative 
or “agent.”2 The California Civil Code defines “agent” in accordance with 
United States common law—an agent is an individual acting on behalf of, and 
owing certain fiduciary duties to, a third party.3 The Broker represents and 
advocates on behalf of the client, acting in the client’s best interest and owing 
the client fiduciary duties of care, honesty, integrity, and loyalty.4 
The agency relationship is much like the relationship between coach and 
team. Each team’s ultimate goal is to win the game, and a knowledgeable coach 
can make all the difference in a close match. Each coach brings a unique 
perspective, practical knowledge, and independent experience to support their 
respective teams. In this scenario, the coach and team are clearly united with a 
common purpose—both succeed when the team “wins” and the opposing team 
“loses.” In a single agency transaction, each buyer and seller typically hires their 
own “coach”—a Broker. The Broker shares his or her knowledge and experience 
with, and is obligated by statute to act in the best interest of, his or her respective 
client as that client attempts to “win” the transaction.5 This arrangement provides 
the represented buyer and seller with clear benefits and broad legal protections.6 
And, of course, the Broker is duly compensated for his or her efforts. 
In today’s real estate market, transactions wherein the same Broker 
simultaneously represents both buyer and seller (an “in-house” or “dual agency” 
transaction) have become commonplace.7 Although prohibited in a few states,8 
 
 2. 45 AM. JUR. 3D Proof of Facts § 12 (1998). 
 3. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2295, 2079.13 (West 2019); see AM. JUR., supra note 2, § 3. 
 4. CIV. §§ 2295, 2079.13; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (AM. L. INST. 2018). 
 5. Arguably, a real estate transaction is not quite as simple as a game of soccer or basketball, in that a 
transaction is not necessarily a zero-sum game. To some extent, both buyer and seller win when both achieve 
their desired result. See infra Part I.E. But see Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The Limits of Integrative Bargaining, 85 
GEO. L.J. 369, 377 (1996) (describing “all exchange transactions in which two parties simply exchange one thing 
for another” as in fact win-lose scenarios rather than win-win scenarios). Whether or not both parties accept the 
result of the transaction as a success, the fact remains that theoretically the buyer will always prefer a lower price 
while the seller will always prefer a higher one. While there can never be a true “win” in a real estate transaction, 
the transaction can be considered as if on a scale, where each party’s goal is to move the scale as far towards 
their own side as possible. 
 6. William D. North, Agency, Facilitation and the Realtor 4 (1993), https://webassets.inman.com/files/ 
stories/Agency_Facilitation_William_North.pdf (unpublished manuscript) (“There have been few more 
spectacular examples of business success in reaching the needs of the consumer than that achieved by the 
Founders of NAR when they [adopted] the advantages of the fiduciary relationship . . . .”). 
 7. Lu Han & Seung-Hyun Hong, In-House Transactions in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry: Matching 
Outcome or Strategic Promotion? 19 (Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.smeal.psu.edu/lema/rea_in_ 
house_0806_2014.pdf (unpublished manuscript) (describing how approximately 20% of transactions in North 
America in 2009 were transacted in-house); see, e.g., Phil Querin, Dual Agency—What Is It, and How Frequently 
Does It Occur in Oregon?, QUERIN L. LLC (Apr. 4, 2015), https://q-law.com/7036/ (describing that 19.2% of 
all Oregon transactions are within the same office). 
 8. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-10-406 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.272 (West 2019); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,103(a) (West 2019). 
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most states, including California, permit dual agency transactions so long as the 
relationships between the buyer, the seller, and the Broker are disclosed and 
consented to in writing by all parties.9  
This practice has long frustrated consumers,10 many of whom question 
whether a Broker practicing dual agency can truly provide the full range of 
fiduciary benefits to both parties as required by law.11 Specifically, consumers 
point to an apparent paradox faced by any individual Broker attempting to act as 
a fiduciary for two adverse parties in a single transaction.12 A Broker in this 
position seems forced to make a difficult, if not impossible choice, either biasing 
his or her actions to benefit one client over the other, or refusing altogether to 
act in either client’s best interest and instead acting neutrally toward both. In 
either case, the Broker apparently fails in his or her fiduciary duties to at least 
one, if not both, represented parties. 
Legislators are not ignorant of consumer concerns about the inherent 
conflicts of interest facing dual agents.13 Such conflicts first came to national 
attention in the 1980s,14 and legislators across the country have responded by 
developing and implementing innovative statutory schemes in an attempt to 
resolve these conflicts while still permitting Brokers to represent both parties in 
the same transaction.15 But given the widespread animosity surrounding dual 
agency representation,16 a more fundamental question must be asked: why do 
legislators continue to tolerate this practice in the first place? Why not simply 
eliminate dual agency altogether? 
This Note explores how California in particular can modernize its statutory 
system in order to resolve consumer frustrations about dual agency while 
retaining some of its important benefits. Part I reviews the historical progression 
 
 9. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2079.13(d), 2079.17(a)–(b) (West 2019); see, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW 
§ 443(4)(a) (McKinney 2019) (providing a disclosure form for buyer and seller); see also infra Part II.  
 10. This Note references the comparative terms “legislators” and “consumers.” In practice, there is likely 
no quintessential consumer or legislator. These concepts are useful mechanisms for interpreting the similarities 
and differences between the law as written in statute (California and otherwise) and the law as understood by 
society as a whole. One might loosely define the “legislator” as an individual who conceptualizes the world 
entirely through the lens of statutory language. By contrast, a “consumer” is an individual who conceptualizes 
the world entirely through media, blog articles, and Wikipedia. 
 11. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Harney, Why Your Real Estate Agent May Not Be on Your Side, WASH. POST 
(Jan. 2, 2019, 3:30 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/realestate/why-your-real-estate-agent-may-not-be-
on-your-side/2018/12/31/b28fe006-0221-11e9-b5df-5d3874f1ac36_story.html?utm_term=.1ffc543f6263; 
Benny L. Kass, Can One Realty Agent Fairly Represent Both Buyer and Seller?, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 7, 2017, 2:00 
PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/classified/realestate/sc-housing-0209-qa-benny-kass-consumer-201702 
08-column.html; Dual Agency—Welcome to the Dark Side of Real Estate, KEVIN VITALI, https://merrimack 
valleymarealestate.com/dual-agency-massachusetts-real-estate/ (last visited Feb. 4, 2021); This Watchdog 
Group Wants States to Ban Dual Agency, REAL DEAL (Jan. 16, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://therealdeal.com/ 
2019/01/16/this-watchdog-group-wants-states-to-ban-dual-agency/. 
 12. See sources cited supra note 11. 
 13. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2079.13(d), 2079.17(a)–(b); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 443(4)(a). 
 14. See Horiike v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 383 P.3d 1094, 1096 (Cal. 2016). 
 15. See infra Part II.B. 
 16. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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of the real estate industry culminating in the emergence of the franchise 
brokerage system. It then details the central conflicts of interest faced by all 
Brokers engaging in dual agency practices. Part II reviews California’s current 
statutory law and analyzes various legislative schemes enacted across the United 
States that attempt to address consumer concerns. Part III reconsiders real estate 
practices and dual agency through the eyes of the consumer, highlighting an 
important disconnect between historically consistent statutory law and the more 
practical (albeit misinformed) consumer conception of real estate agency law. It 
then reinterprets the various statutory schemes previously discussed in Part II, 
analyzing whether and to what extent these legislative systems actually address 
consumer frustrations. Finally, Part IV proposes amendments to California’s 
statutory framework that would align statutory law with the modern practical 
realities of the real estate industry, thereby relieving consumer concerns about 
dual agency without ending the practice entirely. 
I.  HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Statutory law often rides the coattails of evolving business practices. 
Ridesharing services like Uber and Lyft have disrupted the transportation 
industry and left legislators scrambling to adjust.17 Cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin 
have similarly disrupted the financial world.18 But whereas Uber, Lyft, and 
Bitcoin reflect a more sudden industry shift, disruption in the real estate market 
has been decidedly more gradual and unassuming. 
A.  THE WILD WEST OF REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 
The birth of the modern brokerage system began in the late nineteenth 
century.19 The first professional Brokers operated as “‘middlemen’ and had none 
of the fiduciary duties” that present-day consumers have come to expect.20 
Under an “open listing” model, sellers often worked with multiple brokerage 
firms, and “only the broker who could bring a buyer to a sale earned a 
commission.”21 While many Brokers worked together in association, sharing 
their inventory of prospective clients through regional Multiple Listing Services 
 
 17. Organisation for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OCED], Hearing on Disruptive Innovation, at 4, OCED 
Doc. DAF/COMP/WD(2015)54 (June 19, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplay 
documentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WD(2015)54&docLanguage=En (describing how these new platforms 
“rais[e] challenges when their business models may not fit well within existing regulatory frameworks”). 
 18. Helen Narvasa & Heather Morton, The Emergence of Bitcoin, 22 NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, 
Aug. 2014, http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/the-emergence-of-bitcoin.aspx. 
 19. Jeffrey M. Hornstein, A Nation of Realtors®: The Professionalization of Real Estate Brokerage and 
the Construction of a New American Middle Class, 3 ENTER. & SOC’Y 613, 614 (2002). 
 20. Sandra Nelson, Note, The Illinois Real Estate “Designated Agency Amendment”: A Minefield for 
Brokers, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 953, 956 (1994); see also BARLOW BURKE, LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS 
§ 1.01 (4th ed. 2019). 
 21. Matt Carter, From Subagency to Non-Agency: A History, INMAN (Feb. 17, 2012), 
https://www.inman.com/2012/02/17/from-subagency-non-agency-a-history/; see also Brokerage, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
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(“MLS”),22 others chose to keep their inventories private for fear of losing out 
on a commission to a competitor.23 With almost no legal oversight, this industry 
attracted and “encouraged self-dealers, speculators and sharp practices that 
abused the consumer, gave real estate practitioners an extremely poor image, 
and complicated real estate transactions.”24 
B.  THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS   
In 1908, a group of Chicago Brokers formed the National Association of 
Real Estate Exchanges (“NAR”),25 with the goal of standardizing practices 
within the brokerage industry.26 The NAR advocated for a profession grounded 
in agency law,27 where Brokers agreed to act in the seller’s best interest in 
exchange for an exclusive right to sell a particular home.28 The NAR’s model 
has now been adopted throughout the country.29 
Brokers at this time still cooperated with one another through an MLS.30 
When an interested buyer’s Broker (“Cooperating Broker”) delivered an 
interested buyer to the seller’s Broker (“Listing Broker”), the Cooperating 
 
 22. MLS members agreed to compensate one another in exchange for sharing their inventory of buyers and 
sellers. Multiple Listing Service (MLS): What Is It, NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS, https://www.nar.realtor/nar-doj-
settlement/multiple-listing-service-mls-what-is-it (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (“Help me sell my inventory and I’ll 
help you sell yours.”); see also BURKE, supra note 20, § 1.04. But  see FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE RESIDENTIAL 
REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY 108 (1983), https://webassets.inman.com/files/stories/The_Residential_ 
Real_Estate_Brokerage_Industry_1983_FTC.pdf (noting that these associations were not called Multiple 
Listing Services until 1907). 
 23. Carter, supra note 21 (“Brokers were reluctant to market properties or cooperate with each other, 
fearing that a competing broker might take a buyer straight to the seller.”). 
 24. North, supra note 6, at 3. 
 25. National Association of Real Estate Exchanges (NAREE) was later renamed National Association of 
Real Estate Boards (NAREB) and finally National Association of REALTORS® (NAR). History, NAT’L ASS’N 
OF REALTORS, https://www.nar.realtor/about-nar/history (last visited Feb. 4, 2021); see also PEARL JANET 
DAVIES, REAL ESTATE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 44 (1958) (listing the seventeen-year progression toward a 
nationalized system).  
 26. BURKE, supra note 20, § 1.03; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 22, at 85; History, supra note 
25. 
 27. See CAL CIV. CODE §§ 2079.13, 2295, 2319 (West 2019); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
AGENCY § 1 (AM. L. INST. 2018); FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 22, at 174–75; Common-Law Agency, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 28. See CIV. §§ 2079.13, 2295, 2319; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1; FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
supra note 22, at 174–75; Common-Law Agency, supra note 27; see also Exclusive Agency, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 29. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 22, at 174 (“[T]he broker is treated in every state as an agent . . . .”); 
see also Carter, supra note 21 (“Because most MLSs were run by [NAR subsidiary associations, these] local 
associations grew their membership rolls as the system spread . . . . [B]rokers might find their business drying 
up if they didn’t join.”). 
 30. North, supra note 6, at 4 (“There have been few more spectacular examples of business success in 
reaching the needs of the consumer than that achieved by the Founders of NAR when they coupled the 
advantages of the fiduciary relationship represented by exclusive agency with marketing breadth afforded by 
mandatory offers of subagency to other REALTORS.”). 
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Broker acted as a subagent of the Listing Broker and was paid a portion of the 
Listing Broker’s commission.31 
Brokers also began to retain the services of one or more associate 
licensees,32 now known either as salespersons,33 or broker-associates (together, 
“Salespersons”), depending on their license.34 Salespersons acted as the 
Brokers’ subagents or assistants,35 and were closely supervised by the Broker.36 
Importantly, and perhaps counterintuitively, a Salesperson in California was 
(and still is) not considered an “agent” of the client.37 Instead, the Salesperson 
owed duties to the client only indirectly through his or her association with the 
Broker.38 For much of the twentieth century, the Listing Broker, Cooperating 
Broker, and Salespersons all worked on behalf the seller during a transaction—
none represented the buyer.39 
Soon, courts began to hold that Cooperating Brokers and Salespersons who 
interacted with buyers had in fact created agency relationships with those buyers, 
thus owing fiduciary duties to both buyer and seller.40 State legislatures 
responded by reforming the longstanding system so that Cooperating Brokers 
 
 31. BURKE, supra note 20, § 1.09; FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 22, at 182 (quoting California State 
Commissioner David Fox regarding cooperating agent’s fiduciary duty to the seller) (“In most real estate 
transactions, the cooperating agent is considered to be a subagent of the seller and therefore bound to the same 
fiduciary obligation to the seller. The fiduciary obligation carries with it a duty to act in the best interests of the 
seller in all respects and that of course includes negotiating a contract for the seller on the best terms and at the 
best price obtainable.”). 
 32. Horiike v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 383 P.3d 1094, 1096 (Cal. 2016) (“It is 
common practice for associate licensees, acting as agents of the listing broker . . . to assist buyers in the purchase 
of property.”); see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10016 (West 2019) (defining “Real estate salesperson” as one 
“retained by a real estate broker”). 
 33. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079(a) (West 2019); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. OCC. & PROF. § 17-101(j) 
(West 2019). 
 34. See CIV. § 2079(a). Broker-Associates are licensed Brokers who work another Broker. While they are 
capable of working without another Broker’s oversight by law, they choose to work in the same capacity as any 
other Salesperson. For the purposes of this Note, these positions are indistinguishable. CAL. DEP’T OF REAL EST., 
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS REGARDING “BROKER-ASSOCIATE” AFFILIATION NOTIFICATION (2020), 
http://www.dre.ca.gov/files/pdf/faqs/FAQ%20AB%202330%20Broker%20Associate.pdf. 
 35. CIV. § 2349 (“An agent . . . can delegate to [a subagent, given specific circumstances].”). 
 36. North, supra note 6, at 4 (describing the “close supervision and involvement of the broker with his 
salespersons”). 
 37. BUS. & PROF. § 10131; see also CIV. §§ 2079.13(a), 2295 (2019). To clarify, under California law 
Salespersons act as agents of the Broker, and the Broker acts as an agent of the client.  
 38. See BUS. & PROF. § 10131; CIV. §§ 2079.13(a), 2295; see also Horiike v. Coldwell Banker Residential 
Brokerage Co., 383 P.3d 1094, 1101 (Cal. 2016)  (“[A]n associate licensee does not have an independent agency 
relationship with the clients of his or her broker, but rather an agency relationship that is derived from the agency 
relationship between the broker and the client.”). 
 39. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 22, at 180; see also Carter, supra note 21 (“Subagency allowed 
cooperating brokers who worked with buyers to collect a share of the commissions paid by sellers without 
actually representing buyers in an agency capacity.”). 
 40. See Horiike, 383 P.3d at 1096 (“California courts often held that listing agents and cooperating brokers 
were undisclosed dual agents, who owed fiduciary duties to buyers as well as sellers, based on their conduct in 
a transaction.”). 
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could now owe fiduciary duties “solely to the buyer,”41 while still receiving a 
commission from the Listing Broker. California began this reform process in 
1986.42 
C.  EMERGENCE AND DOMINANCE OF FRANCHISE BROKERAGE FIRMS 
The growth in popularity of the franchise real estate brokerage firm 
(“Franchise”) has muddled the distinction between Brokers and their 
Salespersons. Since the 1970s,43 large Franchises have come to dominate a 
significant percentage of all real estate transactions across the United States.44 
Under the Franchise system, a single Broker operating a Franchise 
(“Responsible Broker”)45 might manage and oversee hundreds or even 
thousands of individual Salespersons.46 The Responsible Broker’s primary 
function is management of the Franchise as a whole.47 The Responsible Broker 
typically focuses on hiring capable Salespersons and performing other 
managerial tasks, rather than dealing personally with buyers and sellers.48 Due 
to their relationship with the Franchise and the Responsible Broker, 
Salespersons typically (1) receive certain practical benefits, such as free 
marketing, office space, and greater access to a network of agents in other cities; 
(2) market themselves under a Franchise brand; and (3) remain legal subagents 
of the Responsible Broker.49 In practice, however, Salespersons under the 
Franchise banner operate as individual small businesses rather than as closely 
monitored assistants.50 While many independent Brokers—any Broker not 
 
 41. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., COMPETITION IN THE REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE 
INDUSTRY 8 (2007), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/competition-real-estate-
brokerage-industry-report-federal-trade-commission-and-u.s.department-justice/v050015.pdf. 
 42. See CIV. § 2079.16 (originally enacted as CAL. CIV. CODE § 2375) (“A Buyer’s agent can, with a 
Buyer’s consent, agree to act as agent for the Buyer only. In these situations, the agent is not the Seller’s agent, 
even if by agreement the agent may receive compensation . . . from the Seller.” (emphasis added)); see also id. 
§ 2079.14. 
 43. BURKE, supra note 20, § 1.02. See generally REALTOR MAG., THE BRANDS OF REAL ESTATE (2017), 
https://magazine.realtor/sites/default/files/asset/document/2017_Franchise_Report.pdf (providing a survey of 
real estate franchise companies). 
 44. FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 41, at 31 (highlighting 2004 data that, while 
conflicting, suggests that the top ten brokerage firms had a combined percent market share of approximately 
9.1%). 
 45. Also known as a “broker of record.” CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10015.1 (West 2019) (defining the 
“responsible broker”); see CAL. DEP’T OF REAL EST., supra note 34.  
 46. See BURKE, supra note 20, § 20.03. 
 47. See North, supra note 6, at 2 (describing the “‘body shop’ concept of operation involving minimal 
broker/salesperson contact . . . eroding . . . the desirable, if not absolutely necessary, nexus between broker 
liability and responsibility”). 
 48. See id. 
 49. Agents who choose to associate with a larger (sometimes international) brokerage firm typically pay a 
percentage of their sales commission to that firm in exchange for these benefits. Bernice Ross, Your Real 
Commission Split May Not Be What You Think It Is, INMAN (Jan. 8, 2018) https://www.inman.com/ 
2018/01/08/your-real-commission-split-may-not-be-what-you-think-it-is/. 
 50. North, supra note 6, at 10 (“The prevailing independent contractor relationship between broker and 
salesperson . . . encourages a degree of independence . . . which makes supervision difficult if not practically 
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employed at a Franchise brokerage firm—still interact personally with their 
clients, one can imagine that a personal relationship between a Responsible 
Broker and his or her clients is essentially non-existent at the largest 
Franchises.51 
D.  DUAL AGENCY AND FIDUCIARY CONFLICTS OF INTEREST 
Legislators in California and across the country have long permitted 
Brokers to act as “dual agents.”52 A dual agent is an individual representative 
that acts as both the Listing Broker and Cooperating Broker in the same 
transaction.53 This Broker represents both clients simultaneously, and generally 
receives a commission that would otherwise have been split between two 
independent Brokers.54 
But a dual agency Broker appears to face an untenable decision. Whether 
the Broker chooses to bias his or her actions toward one client over the other, or 
opts instead to treat both clients neutrally, providing each client with limited 
information and withholding the rest,55 the Broker ultimately fails to act in the 
best interest of one or both clients.56 Whereas a single agency Broker is free to 
provide as much support as his or her or experience will allow, a dual agency 
Broker is forced to limit the support given to either (or both) clients, leaving at 
least one client without the full fiduciary benefits demanded by California’s 
statutory law.57 
Reconsider the earlier sports analogy, but now imagine that one person 
coaches two adversarial teams in the same game. This coach may still provide 
some benefit to both teams—his or her general knowledge and experience can 
help each side play the game at their respective highest level. But the coach’s 
ability to benefit one team is clearly limited by his or her simultaneous and 
identical obligations to the other. The coach might discuss general strategies 
with each team, but what happens when the coach has a particular intuition about 
 
impossible and generates a ‘lack of identification’ with the client which encourages representational confusion 
and conflict.”); James Hussaini, Why the Traditional Brokerage Model Is Obsolete, INMAN (Feb. 10, 2015), 
https://www.inman.com/2015/02/10/why-the-traditional-brokerage-model-is-obsolete/ (“Salespeople are the 
owners of their own ‘brand.’”); see, e.g., KELLER WILLIAMS, IDENTITY & STYLE GUIDE 2 (2018), 
https://images.kw.com/shared/mykw/docs/KellerWilliams_StyleGuide_1805.pdf (“Keller Williams believes 
that real estate is a local business, driven by individual agents and the market share they’ve earned.”). 
 51. See CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 10164(a) (West 2019); see also Karl E. Geier, Are You My Broker? The 
Evolving Legal Status of the Real Estate Salesperson, 26 MILLER & STARR REAL EST. NEWSALERT, January 
2016 (describing “another instance of an expanded level of authority and autonomy for salespersons”). 
 52. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.13(d) (West 2019); N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 443(1)(i) (McKinney 
2019); LA.  STAT. ANN. § 9:3897 (West 2019). 
 53. See North, supra note 6, at 5.  
 54. See Lisa Johnson Mandell, What Is Dual Agency? Know When It’s Right, and When to Beware, 
REALTOR.COM (Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.realtor.com/advice/buy/dual-agency/. 
 55. See Horiike v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 383 P.3d 1094, 1097 (Cal. 2016) (citing 
section 2079.21 of the California Civil Code). 
 56. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.  
 57. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
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one team’s weakness? The coach is obligated to protect that team’s interest by 
remaining silent but is obligated to act in the other team’s best interest by sharing 
this valuable insight. The coach’s interests, in other words, cannot 
simultaneously align with those of both teams. If the coach decides to help one, 
he or she has failed in his or her duties to the other. And if the coach decides to 
remain silent, to not share information with either team, then the coach has failed 
both teams simultaneously. 
E.  CONSUMER BENEFITS IN A NON-ZERO-SUM GAME 
Consumers have long criticized legislative acceptance of the conflicts of 
interest inherent within dual agency.58 This criticism is perhaps based on the 
perception that real estate transactions are essentially zero-sum—because both 
parties are ultimately interested only in receiving or saving the most money, no 
one Broker can forward both parties’ goals at the same time.59 
However, dual agency representation does provide certain powerful 
benefits that often go unacknowledged by those who vilify the practice 
categorically. First, dual agency allows consumers to retain the services of their 
preferred Broker regardless of that Broker’s concurrent relationships with any 
others.60 Without dual agency, for example, a buyer interested in a home 
currently listed by his or her Broker would either be forced to work with another 
(perhaps unknown and untrusted) Broker, or he or she would be prohibited from 
purchasing that home. From a consumer choice perspective, dual agency 
provides buyers and sellers the best of both worlds—freedom to choose their 
representative and freedom to purchase any property on the market, regardless 
of which Broker lists that property.61 Second, dual agency transactions tend to 
take significantly less time than single agency transactions.62 A 2014 study of 
the New York real estate market indicates that dual agency transactions close up 
to eight percent faster than single agency transactions.63 The same study found 
no substantial difference in final sales prices between single agency and dual 
agency transactions.64 Given that real property is a notoriously non-liquid 
asset,65 parties may be more interested in completing the transaction quickly than 
 
 58. See Drouillard, supra note 1, at 89. 
 59. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 60. Drouillard, supra note 1, at 100 (“[D]ual agency may not be intrinsically harmful. The idea that an 
agent may act for parties with competing interests in a real estate transaction with their informed consent is 
reasonable in theory. It upholds the principle of party autonomy and protects the freedom that competent 
individuals should have to fashion a bargain as they please.”). 
 61. Id. 
 62. Vrinda Kadiyali, Jeffrey Prince & Daniel H. Simon, Is Dual Agency in Real Estate a Cause for 
Concern?, 48 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 164, 188, 192 (2014). 
 63. Id. at 167. 
 64. Id. (“[D]ual agency regulation distorts transaction outcomes . . . [but] our results provide little support 
for the prohibition of dual agency in any form (either . . . within-branch, or dual agent).”). 
 65. See Colton Hoisager, Understanding Illiquidity in Real Estate Investing, REALIZED (Sept. 16, 2020), 
https://www.realized1031.com/blog/understanding-illiquidity-in-real-estate-investing. 
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obtaining the absolute best price. Given these consumer benefits, it stands to 
reason that legislators may hesitate to abolish the practice altogether, even at the 
behest of a frustrated constituency. 
II.  A REVIEW OF STATUTORY LAW 
California became the first state to address dual agency concerns in 1986,66 
when it enacted strict disclosure and consent laws requiring Brokers to better 
educate their clients about the nature and risks of real estate agency 
relationships.67 In California, a Broker must disclose to all parties whether he or 
she acts exclusively for the seller, exclusively for the buyer, or simultaneously 
for both buyer and seller as a dual agent.68 Brokers are also required to disclose 
the nature of their agency relationship “[a]s soon as practicable,” and Brokers 
must later “confirm[] in the contract to purchase and sell real property.”69 
Confirmation is crucial because agency relationships may change over time. For 
example, a Broker may agree to represent a seller exclusively, but later meet an 
unrepresented buyer interested in purchasing the seller’s home. Presuming all 
parties consent, the Broker’s relationship with the seller now shifts from single 
agency to dual agency. Confirmation notifies each party of this changing 
relationship so that all are fully informed about the nature of their representation 
throughout the transaction. The California Association of Realtors (“CAR”) also 
regularly updates its standardized disclosure contracts.70 For example, CAR’s 
most recent purchase agreement now states that the parties are entering into a 
“dual agent” transaction when (a) both parties are represented by the same 
Broker, and (b) both parties are represented by the same Salesperson.71 In either 
case, a dual agency relationship is formed,72 because the Salesperson is merely 
an extension of the Broker.73 
California statutory law articulates what can best be described as the pre-
Franchise interpretation of the real estate industry, wherein a Broker maintains 
a close relationship with clients and actively engages with them throughout the 
transaction.74 Legislators understand the Broker to be an active participant in 
each transaction, intimately and directly connected with the represented party.75 
 
 66. Horiike v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 383 P.3d 1094, 1096 (Cal. 2016). 
 67. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.17 (West 2019). 
 68. See Horiike, 383 P.3d at 1097 (“An agent that obtains a buyer for a property . . . must disclose whether 
it is ‘acting in the real property transaction exclusively as the buyer’s agent, exclusively as the seller’s agent, or 
as a dual agent . . . .’” (quoting CIV. § 2079.17(a))). 
 69. CIV. § 2079.17. 
 70. See 2 MILLER & STARR CAL. REAL EST. § 6:20 n.9 (4th ed. 2015). 
 71. 2019 Real Estate Clean Up Law Changes, CAL. ASS’N OF REALTORS® (Nov. 20, 2018), 
https://www.car.org/en/riskmanagement/qa/New-Laws/2019-Clean-Up-Law-Changes (question 7).  
 72. Id. 
 73. See id. (question 8); see also CAL. DEP’T OF REAL EST., supra note 34. 
 74. See supra Part I.B.  
 75. Grand v. Griesinger, 325 P.2d 475, 481 (Cal. 1958) (“It is evident that brokers and salesmen belong in 
distinctly different categories and that the broker, because of his superior knowledge, experience and proven 
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Conversely, the Broker’s Salespersons (if any) are envisioned as closely-
monitored assistants, engaging with the Broker’s clients only when the Broker’s 
attention need be elsewhere.76 
Given California’s emphasis on the direct relationship between Broker and 
client, it makes sense why California understands the Broker to be the true 
“agent” and imputes fiduciary duties like loyalty and honesty onto the Broker 
rather than his or her Salespersons.77 Simply put, California views the Broker as 
the only individual in the position to act loyally or honestly toward the public.78 
While the Broker’s clients presumably expect something akin to fiduciary 
qualities from the Broker’s assistants, that expectation comes only from the fact 
that the Salesperson is a theoretical extension of the Broker.79 
A.  THE CALIFORNIA STATUTORY ARTICULATION OF DUAL AGENCY 
Because the Broker is the only true “agent” in the transaction,80 it stands to 
reason that the Broker is the only potential “dual” agent. The logic is 
inescapable; only the individual having fiduciary responsibilities can ever find 
those duties divided. According to California statutory law, the Broker is the 
dual agent regardless of whether (a) the Broker actively represents both the 
buyer and seller in the same transaction, (b) one of the Broker’s Salespersons 
represents both the buyer and seller in the same transaction, or (c) two of the 
Broker’s Salespersons each represent separate parties in the same transaction.81 
Consider the recent California Supreme Court case Horiike v. Coldwell 
Banker Residential Brokerage Co.82 Defendant Coldwell Banker, a Franchise 
brokerage firm, represented both the sellers and buyer through two Salespersons: 
Chris Cortazzo worked personally with the sellers, a trust, while Chizuko Namba 
worked personally with the buyer.83 Cortazzo worked in Coldwell Banker’s 
Malibu West office while Namba worked in Coldwell Banker’s Beverly Hills 
office.84 Both offices are affiliated branches under the same Franchise, which 
 
stability is authorized to deal with the public, contract with its members and collect money from them; the 
salesman, on the other hand, is strictly the agent of the broker.”). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 96–99 (Ct. App. 1984). The court notes that the 
appellant, a brokerage firm, was “represented in the sale of the property by its agents Simkin and Mourning,” 
while in the same opinion describes that “current law requires a broker to disclose to a buyer material defects 
known to the broker” as if the brokerage firm itself might have personal knowledge of the defects known by 
Simkin and Mourning. Id. (emphasis added). The court in this case even states that “a broker is negligent if he 
fails to disclose defects which he should have discovered through reasonable diligence,” strongly implying that 
the court views the broker as the ultimately responsible party in the transaction, whether or not all of his or her 
actions are delegated. Id. at 99 (emphasis added). 
 78. See supra Part I.B.   
 79. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 10131 (West 2019); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2079.13(a), 2295 (West 2019). 
 80. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.  
 81. See supra notes 71–72 and accompanying text.  
 82. Horiike v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 383 P.3d 1094 (Cal. 2016). 
 83. Id. at 1097–98. 
 84. Id. 
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employs over 5,000 Salespersons.85 Plaintiff Horiike, the buyer, sued Coldwell 
Banker and Cortazzo for failure to disclose material information during the 
transaction.86 The court considered “whether Cortazzo, as an associate licensee 
representing Coldwell Banker [though acting on behalf of the sellers] . . . owed 
a duty to [the buyer] Horiike.”87 The court held that both Cortazzo and Namba 
owed fiduciary duties to the buyer because “[a]n associate licensee, by 
definition, is either ‘licensed under a broker’ or has contracted ‘to act as the 
broker’s agent.’”88 Furthermore, citing Grand v. Griesinger,89 the court in 
Horiike found that California’s “entire statutory scheme requires the broker 
actively to conduct his brokerage business and to supervise the activities of his 
salesmen.”90 In other words, the court understood California statutory law to 
presume an active and involved Broker, even when that Broker oversaw 
thousands of Salespersons at once.91 The personal relationship that each 
Salesperson had with their own client was irrelevant to the court’s decision.92 
Cortazzo and Namba, while in a practical sense representing their own clients 
“exclusively,” were both legally obligated to act in the interest of all of the 
Responsible Broker’s clients.93 
After the Horiike decision, it stands to reason that a Broker in California, 
whether acting directly on behalf of each client or indirectly through one or more 
Salespersons, faces the same difficult decision that all other dual agents face.94 
B.  STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO DUAL AGENCY CONFLICTS OF 
INTEREST  
Certainly, the California legislature’s decision to protect buyers and sellers 
by informing them about the complex nature of agency relationships is 
laudable.95 That said, there is no indication that California’s disclosure and 
consent requirements have ever addressed dual agency’s inherent conflicts of 
interest. In Horiike, the California Supreme Court referenced an Office of Senate 
Floor Analyses determination that the “disclosure statute [was] not intended to 
 
 85. Both are affiliated with the same Broker of Record or “Designated Officer.” Public License 
Information, CAL. DEP’T REAL EST., http://www2.dre.ca.gov/PublicASP/pplinfo.asp?start=1 (search for License 
ID# 00616212) (last visited Feb. 4, 2021); see also Coldwell Banker Awards Gentry Sales Designation, 
SDNEWS.COM (May 20, 2014, 1:28 PM), http://www.sdnews.com/view/full_story/25137605/article-Coldwell-
Banker-awards-Gentry-sales-designation (showing that Coldwell Banker Southwest Region employed 
approximately 5200 salespersons in 2014). 
 86. Horiike, 383 P.3d at 1095, 1100. 
 87. Id. at 1100. 
 88. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 2079.17(b)). 
 89. See Grand v. Griesinger, 325 P.2d 475, 481 (Cal. 1958). 
 90. Horiike, 383 P.3d at 1101 (quoting Grand, 325 P.2d at 481).  
 91. See supra notes 37, 67 and accompanying text.  
 92. See generally Horiike, 383 P.3d 1094. 
 93. Id. at 1104. 
 94. See supra Part I.D. 
 95. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  
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address ‘the fundamental problem in dual agency relationships.’”96 The court 
noted that “[a]lthough the legislature was certainly aware of these concerns 
when it enacted the disclosure statute, it opted not to address them directly.”97 
Thankfully, California is no longer the only state to have taken steps toward 
safeguarding consumer interests during real estate transactions. States across the 
country have developed progressive, innovative statutory schemes in an effort 
to resolve consumer concerns and relieve Brokers of the challenges stemming 
from dual agency conflicts of interest. 
1.  Designated Agency 
States such as Massachusetts and Connecticut now permit Brokers to 
designate individual Salespersons to exclusively represent a single client 
(“Designated Agency”) in lieu of representing the client personally.98 In 
Massachusetts, when a buyer who is represented by a Broker seeks to purchase 
a home from a seller represented by the same Broker, the Broker may impute his 
or her fiduciary obligations onto an individual subagent.99 Each Salesperson then 
represents their respective clients directly and “may not share known or acquired 
information with any other real estate agent or person that would harm the 
[client’s] interest in the . . . transaction.”100 The Broker becomes neutral with 
respect to the transaction, and has the responsibility only to maintain 
confidentiality and manage each client’s funds.101 In Connecticut, the Broker 
likewise designates his or her subagents to be the “primary” representatives of 
two competing clients.102 The Connecticut Broker may even designate the same 
Salesperson to represent both buyer and seller, in which case that Salesperson 
becomes a “dual agent.”103 In either case, the Broker is sidelined and relieved of 
his or her fiduciary responsibilities, thus no longer facing a dual agency conflict 
of interest. 
 
 96. Horiike, 383 P.3d at 1104 (quoting Senate Rules Comm., Off. of Senate Floor Analyses, Analysis of 
Assemb. Bill No. 1034 (1985–86 Reg. Sess.)).  
 97. Id. 
 98. 254 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.00(13)(c) (West 2019); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-325i (West 2019). 
 99. See 254 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.00(13)(c) (noting that Salespersons, as the exclusive representatives of a 
particular client, may not share material information with the exclusive representative of another party).  
 100. Id. Compare Designated Agency with the practice of “screening” at law firms. The American Bar 
Association’s Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits a law firm from representing a client with whom it has a 
conflict of interest. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.7, 1.9 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018). When that conflict 
arises from an attorney’s prior association with the client at another firm, the attorney’s current firm can still 
represent the client so long as the conflicted attorney is “screened,” or separated entirely, from the client and any 
other attorneys representing the client. See id. r. 1.10. While the ABA only permits screening when an attorney 
is conflicted due to his work at a prior firm, Designated Agency can occur regardless of where and when the 
conflict arose, so long as each designated agent remains separate from the other. See 254 MASS. CODE REGS. 
3.00(13)(c). 
 101. 254 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.00(13)(c). 
 102. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-325i. 
 103. Id. Cf. 254 MASS. CODE REGS. 3.00(13)(c) (providing that Massachusetts Brokers retain the title of 
Dual Agent after designating Salespersons; however, Brokers need not disclose separately their dual agency 
status so long as both clients have been informed about the Designated Agency status). 
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2.  Transaction Brokerage 
States like Colorado, Florida, and Kansas have effectively abolished the 
practice of dual agency altogether by creating a new optional representative 
class—the transaction Broker (“Transaction Broker”).104 Just as Brokers forego 
fiduciary duties in a Designated Agency system, the Transaction Broker likewise 
maintains a non-agency relationship with his or her clients.105 But whereas 
buyers and sellers in a Designated Agency state receive fiduciary protections 
from individual Salespersons, parties in a Transaction Brokerage state do not.106 
Instead, the Broker continues to work with each party in a limited capacity, 
supporting each with “the paperwork and formalities of the real estate 
transaction . . . . but . . . not represent[ing] either [client] in a fiduciary capacity 
or as a single agent.”107 In other words, the Transaction Broker no longer acts as 
an “agent” in almost any sense of the word; his or her position might better be 
classified more broadly as a “dual facilitator” than a dual agent.108 Thus, the 
Transaction Broker system bypasses dual agency conflicts of interest by simply 
removing fiduciary duties from the equation altogether. 
C.  COMMONALITY BETWEEN THE VARIOUS STATUTORY SCHEMES 
It bears repeating that each of these statutory schemes share one important 
feature—none outright prohibit a single Broker from representing (in some 
capacity or another) both parties in the same transaction.109 While state 
legislatures could simply prohibit dual representation altogether, those of 
Massachusetts, Colorado, and California appear to agree that the practice is 
worth preserving, in at least some form.110 Support for Designated Agency might 
imply a legislative attempt to provide common-law agency protections and 
benefits to clients in both single agency and dual agency transactions.111 And 
support for the Transaction Broker system, while an effective abandonment of 
common-law agency, might imply a legislative attempt to retain consumer 
freedom of choice and to give consumers the non-monetary benefits that dual 
agency transactions may provide.112 
 
 104. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-10-402(8) (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.278(1)(a) (West 2019); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,102(u) (West 2019). 
 105. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-10-402(8); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.278(1)(a), (2); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-
30,113. Each statute specifically describes that a transaction broker does not act as a legal agent. 
 106. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,102(u) (“The term [transaction broker] includes the broker’s 
affiliated licensees.”). 
 107. 10 PATRICK J. ROHAN, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW AND PRACTICE § 3.22 (2018); see, e.g., FLA. 
STAT. § 475.278(2) (including a list of limited responsibilities taken by a transaction broker); see also Ann 
Morales Olazábal, Redefining Realtor Relationships and Responsibilities: The Failure of State Regulatory 
Responses, 40 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 65, 87 (2003) (describing Transaction Brokers as “middlemen or go-
betweens . . . beholden to the transaction first and foremost, and who do not individually represent either party”). 
 108. Cf. 5 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 5-20.6-6 (West 2020). 
 109. See generally supra Part II. 
 110. See generally supra Part II. 
 111. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 112. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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III.  THE CONSUMER CONCEPTION OF DUAL AGENCY 
Much has been said about the need for statutory law to adapt over time to 
the practical realities of the modern era.113 But while California, Connecticut, 
and Colorado have made great strides in attempting to relieve conflicts of 
interest for dual agency Brokers,114 consumers have thus far not been satisfied 
by the results.115 Why have so many legislative efforts ultimately failed to quell 
public frustration? In truth, the strengthening of disclosure-and-consent 
requirements, and the creation of new legal titles like Designated Agency and 
Transaction Brokers, can best be described as “band-aid” solutions to a deeper 
wound. While Designated Agency resolves the Broker’s own agency conflicts 
by placing fiduciary duties onto others,116 and while Transaction Brokers avoid 
agency conflicts by removing fiduciary duties from the equation altogether,117 
neither system resolves more fundamental consumer concerns because, simply 
put, consumers are not actually concerned with the Broker’s fiduciary conflicts. 
To see why, one must consider the consumer’s alternative conception of the real 
estate industry, its various players and their responsibilities. 
Ignoring or disregarding statutory law, consumers instead perceive a 
decidedly post-Franchise world, wherein Brokers are often passively 
disconnected from their clients and Salespersons take a more active role in the 
transaction process.118 Without a personal connection between Broker and 
client, it would make little sense for a client to ask for loyalty or honesty from 
their Broker. Instead, the client places his or her fiduciary expectations onto a 
new (and decidedly non-statutory119) player—the “Real Estate Agent.”120 
This Note does not attempt to determine at what point, or from where, this 
modern notion of a Real Estate Agent originated.121 What is clear, however, is 
that the concept of a Real Estate Agent is now heavily ingrained within modern 
culture throughout the country.122 Consumers do not receive information from 
 
 113. Legal scholar Guido Calabresi noted a trend of “growing obsolescence” as rigid statutory law comes 
to dominate over flexible common law principles. GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF 
STATUTES 81 (1982). 
 114. See supra Part II.B. 
 115. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 117. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 118. See supra notes 46, 49 and accompanying text; see infra Part III.A. 
 119. California’s Business and Professions Code does not include the term “real estate agent,” but instead 
distinguishes between a “real estate salesperson,” a “broker associate,” and a “responsible broker.” See CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 10016, 10015.3, 10015.1 (West 2019). See generally id. div. 4, pt. 1, ch. 1 (excluding 
the term “real estate agent” in the “General Provisions”).  
 120. See infra Part III.A. 
 121. See North, supra note 6, at 1 (“The confusion, recriminations, ignorance, and self-interest which has 
characterized the discussions of the agency relationship of real estate brokers and salespersons . . . has 
reached . . . the crisis point. As a result of the agency debate, the real estate broker is rapidly becoming ‘all things 
to all persons’ . . . .”). 
 122. See 2019 Real Estate Clean Up Law Changes, supra note 71 (acknowledging that terms like “agent” 
have taken on new meaning and that “non-professionals” now understand these terms differently than statutory 
law defines them). 
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one source, but presumably piece their conception of real estate practices from 
a variety of sources, including dictionaries, encyclopedias, websites, and 
everyday communications with friends and family.123 That said, a number of 
reputable informative websites directed at and designed to educate the public 
can help paint a picture of this modern interpretation of Real Estate Agents and 
of agency relationships in general. 
A.  DEFINING THE CONSUMER CONCEPTION OF “REAL ESTATE AGENT” AND 
“BROKER” 
The concept of Real Estate Agent can most simply be defined as the 
individual with whom the client (a) has a personal relationship with and (b) 
interacts directly with throughout the transaction process. Investopedia, for 
example, defines the Real Estate Agent as “an industry professional who serves 
as the facilitator of real estate transactions . . . . [and is] ultimately responsible 
for bringing buyers and sellers together.”124 It then notes that the Real Estate 
Agent “can represent both buyers and sellers involved in a real estate 
transaction.”125 Redfin similarly defines a Real Estate Agent as “an individual 
who helps people buy and sell homes in exchange for a commission.”126 
Bankrate defines the Real Estate Agent as an active player in the transaction—
describing the agent as a “licensed professional who guides buyers and 
sellers . . . . [and] help[s] price and prepare a property . . . . When an agent 
works with a buyer, he works to find properties on the market.”127 LegalMatch 
describes Real Estate Agents as persons who “[r]eview real estate contracts,” 
“[n]egotiate pricing,” or “[s]howcase properties and guide clients through walk-
throughs and open houses.”128 
While the definition of Broker is less clear cut, these resources often 
describe the Broker as passive managers overseeing the brokerage firm as a 
whole. According to Investopedia, for example, the Real Estate Agent “act[s] as 
[the client’s] representative in negotiations,” while the Broker “typically own[s] 
a firm or a franchise. . . . [This requires] another higher-level license if they want 
 
 123. NAT’L ASS’N OF REALTORS® RSCH. DEP’T, REAL ESTATE IN A DIGITAL AGE 6–7 (2017), 
https://www.nar.realtor/sites/default/files/reports/2017/2017-real-estate-in-a-digital-age-03-10-2017.pdf 
(explaining that 13% of all buyers looked online for information about the home buying process, and 11% of 
millennials talked with a friend or relative). 
 124. Troy Segal, Real Estate Agents vs. Brokers vs. Realtors: What’s the Difference?, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/101314/what-are-differences-among-real-estate-agent-broker-and-
realtor.asp (Sept. 8, 2020). 
 125. Id. 
 126. What’s a Real Estate Agent?, REDFIN, https://www.redfin.com/definition/real-estate-agent (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2021). Note that Redfin is an online brokerage firm, not an informational website. 
 127. Real Estate Agent, BANKRATE, https://www.bankrate.com/glossary/r/real-estate-agent/ (last visited 
Feb. 4, 2021).  
 128. Buy and Sell Home, LEGALMATCH, https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/purchase-and-
sale-of-residence.html (Feb. 19, 2020). 
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to hire agents.”129 It clarifies that “[u]sually . . . agents work for brokers and split 
commissions with them.”130 
Most importantly, and in direct contrast to the statutory conception,131 these 
websites tend to place fiduciary responsibilities directly with the active Real 
Estate Agent rather than the Broker. Redfin states that real estate agents 
“must . . . join a brokerage firm,”132 appearing to equate the Real Estate Agent 
with the legal Salesperson, but then describes that “real estate agents are in a 
fiduciary relationship with their clients.”133 LegalMatch describes that “[i]n 
most cases, when speaking of an ‘agent’, the person is talking about a 
salesperson as opposed to a broker ([who] tends to handle higher-level real estate 
issues),”134 but then notes that “real estate agents” owe fiduciary duties to the 
client.135 Bankrate likewise distinguishes between the Real Estate Agent and 
Broker,136 but ultimately attributes fiduciary responsibilities onto the Real Estate 
Agent directly.137 
Thus, the critical distinction between the consumer conception and 
statutory law becomes apparent. To the consumer, the Real Estate Agent is 
defined not by his or her legal status (that is, a Broker or Salesperson) but by his 
or her personal relationship to the client. The Real Estate Agent is the active 
participant who support the client through the transaction process. And, in the 
mind of the consumer, the Real Estate Agent (and not necessarily the Broker) 
owes fiduciary duties directly to the client. 
B.  DEFINING THE CONSUMER CONCEPTION OF DUAL AGENCY 
If the Real Estate Agent is understood to owe fiduciary duties directly to 
the consumer, the consumer’s interpretation of “dual agency” also takes on a 
new meaning from statutory law. Because consumers look to their Real Estate 
 
 129. Real Estate Agent, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/r/realestateagent.asp (Jan. 19, 
2021). 
 130. Id.; see also Segal, supra note 124 (“A real estate agent is an industry professional who serves as the 
facilitator of real estate transactions. . . . A broker, on the other hand, may work independently or start their own 
brokerage and employ other real estate agents.”). Cf. James Chen, Real Estate Agent, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://web.archive.org/web/20190330085506/https:/www.investopedia.com/terms/r/realestateagent.asp (Jan. 
28, 2018) (“Real estate brokers typically own a firm or a franchise, and they are responsible for setting up earnest 
money accounts and for approving final contracts. . . . Agents work for brokers, and they split their commissions 
with these supervisors.”). 
 131. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 132. What’s a Real Estate Agent?, supra note 126.  
 133. What Is a Fiduciary in Real Estate?, REDFIN.COM, https://www.redfin.com/definition/fiduciary (last 
visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
 134. What Is a Real Estate Agent?, LEGALMATCH, https://www.legalmatch.com/law-library/article/what-
is-a-real-estate-agent.html (July 5, 2018).  
 135. Real Estate Agent Liability: Breach of Fiduciary Duty, LEGALMATCH, https://www.legalmatch.com/ 
law-library/article/real-estate-agent-liability-breach-of-fiduciary-duty.html (May 11, 2018). 
 136. Real Estate Agent, supra note 127. 
 137. Fiduciary Duty, BANKRATE, https://www.bankrate.com/glossary/f/fiduciary-duty/#:~:text=Fiduciary 
%20duty%20is%20a%20requirement,on%20behalf%20of%20a%20client (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
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Agent as their “agent,”138 the consumers also sensibly, albeit legally 
incorrectly,139 imagine dual agency to mean a single Real Estate Agent 
representing both buyer and seller in the same transaction. This view is 
increasingly supported by those online resources already discussed. According 
to Redfin.com, dual agency “occurs when the same real estate agent represents 
both the seller and buyer.”140 Bankrate states that “[d]ual agency . . . refers to a 
situation when one real estate agent represents both the home buyer and seller 
in a transaction.”141 In other words, each of these websites equates dual agency 
with the Real Estate Agent rather than the Broker. In fact, Bankrate declares that 
“dual agency does not apply in situations where the buyer and seller are 
represented by different agents working under the same broker,”142 in direct 
contradiction to California law.143 
Why is the distinction between statutory law and the consumer conception 
relevant to resolving underlying public concerns about fiduciary conflicts of 
interest in dual agency transactions? Recall that in many Franchise brokerage 
firms, one Responsible Broker can oversee thousands of individual 
Salespersons.144 Under California law, transactions that involve any of that 
Broker’s Salespersons are, by legal definition, dual agency transactions.145 Yet, 
by and large, consumers are unconcerned with the idea that a Responsible 
Broker, taking on a purely managerial role, carries the legal mantle of “dual 
agent” when he or she is only passively connected to either transacting party.146 
Instead, consumers are concerned primarily with the fact that their Real Estate 
Agent, tasked with actively guiding the transaction and intimately connected 
with their clients, may not fully represent their interests. 
 
 138. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.  
 139. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.  
 140. What Is Dual Agency?, REDFIN, https://www.redfin.com/definition/dual-agency (last visited Feb. 4, 
2021). 
 141. Dual Agency, BANKRATE, https://www.bankrate.com/glossary/d/dual-agency/ (last visited Feb. 4, 
2021). 
 142. Id. (emphasis added). By describing full representation by subagents underneath the same broker, 
Bankrate necessarily describes the consumer view because this description is simply false under many statutory 
codes, including the California Civil Code. 
 143. See supra Part II.A. 
 144. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see, e.g., We’re Here to Help You Find Your Perfect, 
BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY, https://www.bhhscalifornia.com/about (last visited Feb. 4, 2021) (“Berkshire 
Hathaway HomeServices California Properties has grown to nearly 3,000 sales associates in close to 60 offices 
spanning the Central Coast to San Diego.”). 
 145. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
 146. See, e.g., Bill Gassett, Dual Agency Should Be Banned in All States, ACTIVERAIN (Apr. 18, 2017, 4:21 
AM), https://activerain.com/blogsview/5044645/dual-agency-should-be-banned-in-all-states (“Frankly, dual 
agency is the dumbest thing . . . . [but] in some places dual agency is defined as when two agents from the same 
company each represent a buyer and a seller . . . . I have no problem with this arrangement . . . .”); see also Carol 
Solfanelli, Don’t Let Your Real Estate Agent Represent the Other Side!, SF CURB APPEAL (Feb. 21, 2017),  
https://www.sfcurbappeal.com/buying/dont-let-your-agent-represent-the-other-side (“By definition, dual 
agency includes not only one person representing both sides, it also includes different agents from the same 
brokerage firm . . . . I have no problem with the latter situation.” (emphasis added)). 
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C.  RECONSIDERING STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 
Given the important role of the Real Estate Agent in the consumer 
conception, it becomes clear why various legislative responses have largely 
failed to relieve public concerns—each focuses on the Broker and do not 
effectively address the Real Estate Agent’s potential conflicts.147 When 
legislators focus their efforts only on modifying or eliminating the Broker’s 
fiduciary responsibilities, they are quite simply addressing the wrong problem. 
And because the legislative focus is misdirected, the statutory schemes they 
create are often ineffective or incomplete. 
A reassessment of Designated Agency and Transaction Broker systems 
through the lens of the consumer shines a dramatic light on the practical 
successes and failures of each approach. 
1.  Designated Agency 
Designated Agency attempts to bypass the Broker’s fiduciary conflicts by 
shifting that burden to the Salesperson.148 But in a state like Connecticut, where 
Brokers can designate a single Salesperson to represent both buyer and seller,149 
that Salesperson now faces the same conflict of interest that once troubled the 
Broker. And recall that most consumers presume that their Salesperson, as their 
active representative or Real Estate Agent, already owed fiduciary duties in the 
first place. In other words, a system that allows for single Salesperson 
representation fails because it shifts agency conflicts directly to the individuals 
that consumers already believed faced those conflicts in the first place.  
2.  Transaction Broker 
The Transaction Broker scheme takes an uncompromising approach to 
resolving dual agency conflicts of interest by removing fiduciary responsibilities 
from all parties involved, whether Broker or Salesperson.150 Fiduciary conflicts 
are eliminated altogether because their very premise is revoked—consumers 
need not be concerned about their “agent’s” conflicting loyalties because that 
individual no longer has any loyalty to give. 
As previously discussed, however, the industry’s reliance on agency law 
tends to benefit consumers overall.151 And implicit with consumer complaints 
about dual agency is the view that single agency, or the ability to have a 
professional acting solely in the consumer’s best interest, is desirable.152 
Complaints about dual agency conflicts of interest suggest that consumers want 
stronger fiduciary protections, not a lack of protections. While legislators in 
 
 147. See supra Part III. 
 148. See Horiike v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co., 383 P.3d 1094, 1104 (Cal. 2016). 
 149. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-325i (West 2019). 
 150. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,102(u) (West 2019). 
 151. See supra Part I.E. 
 152. Cf. supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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Colorado, Florida, and Kansas have created an option that effectively eliminates 
the potential for agency conflicts,153 that option arguably removes the most 
beneficial attribute of the real estate representatives: agency.154 Put another way, 
in their attempt to remove the coach’s conflicts of interest, legislators have 
essentially fired the coach and hired a referee. 
IV.  A PROPOSED SOLUTION 
While statutory changes in California, Connecticut, and Kansas each 
independently fail to fully resolve consumer concerns about dual agency 
conflicts of interest, a solution might be created through a combination of all 
three statutory schemes. 
A.  THE PROPOSAL 
California statutory law must adapt and conform to the lay conception of 
the real estate industry. The law has become obsolete,155 and the California 
legislature is ultimately responsible for remaking antiquated law so that it 
comports with present-day realities—adoption of the consumer conception is the 
most direct method of achieving this outcome. The proposal outlined in this Note 
achieves the following: (a) it promotes the consumer conception of the active 
Real Estate Agent having direct fiduciary responsibilities to their clients; (b) it 
gives consumers the ultimate freedom to select their preferred Real Estate Agent, 
regardless of his or her ties to a Broker; and (c) in cases where imparting 
fiduciary duties onto a single Real Estate Agent creates a conflict of interest (that 
is, when both parties select the same Real Estate Agent), it allows the Real Estate 
Agent to act as a facilitator to both, without owing fiduciary duties to either. 
First, Brokers should be understood and defined legally not as active 
participants but as passive overseers (“Managing Brokers”) who remain neutral 
with respect to individual transactions and owe no fiduciary duties toward either 
client. Conversely, Real Estate Agents, defined as the individuals who work 
actively with buyers and sellers regardless of licensing status, should owe 
fiduciary duties directly to their respective clients.156 Just as with today’s 
distinction between Brokers and Salespersons, Managing Brokers should still be 
required to hold additional licenses over their Real Estate Agent counterparts.157 
 
 153. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-10-407 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 475.278(1)(a) (West 2019); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,102(u). 
 154. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,102(u). 
 155. See supra Part I; see also SOFIA RANCHORDÁS, CONSTITUTIONAL SUNSETS AND EXPERIMENTAL 
LEGISLATION 19 (2014) (quoting Francis Lieber “who argued that ‘all that is in a code which is not conformable 
to the spirit of society must fall to the ground’” and noting that “[o]bsolescence of legislation could be the price 
to pay for holding on to rules that last longer than the phenomena they originally aimed to regulate”). 
 156. This would include (using the former statutory terminology as a comparison) both Salespersons and 
Brokers. 
 157. See Requirements to Apply for a Real Estate Broker License, CAL. DEP’T OF REAL EST., 
http://www.dre.ca.gov/examinees/RequirementsBroker.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2021). 
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The primary distinction between today’s Broker and tomorrow’s Managing 
Broker, or between today’s Salesperson and tomorrow’s Real Estate Agent, is 
that while Brokers and Salespersons were defined by their relationship to one 
other, Managing Brokers and Real Estate Agents will be defined by their 
relationships to the clients. The result: the law will better conform to common 
sensibilities about the role of real estate representation. 
Second, California should adopt a Designated Agency system, wherein the 
Managing Broker must necessarily designate the role of Real Estate Agent to a 
licensed individual in his or her brokerage firm, thus imputing fiduciary duties 
onto that individual. This does not mean that an individual acting as Managing 
Broker cannot elect to represent his or her own client directly. Managing Brokers 
who would choose to actively engage with their clients could still do so—they 
would simply self-designate as a Real Estate Agent for the purposes of the 
transaction, thereby imputing fiduciary duties onto themselves and foregoing 
their neutral status in such cases.158 
In other words, statutory law should clearly divide legal obligations of 
Managing Brokers from Real Estate Agents, so that a Managing Broker is 
always the designator and the Real Estate Agent is always the designatee. It 
should clarify that only Real Estate Agents owe fiduciary duties, while 
Managing Brokers remain neutral. The result: current dual agency conflicts of 
interest at the Broker level—conflicts faced by a Broker who employs two 
Salespersons each representing their respective party in the same transaction—
are resolved because Managing Brokers no longer hold fiduciary duties. 
Third, California should adopt a Transaction Broker system for those cases 
where both buyer and seller prefer to be represented by the same Real Estate 
Agent.159 Here, the Managing Broker relieves the Real Estate Agent of all 
fiduciary responsibilities and directs the Real Estate Agent to act merely as a 
neutral coordinator. Clients would thus retain the option to each select the same 
representative, but that representative would no longer face fiduciary conflicts 
of interest. Presumably, this option would apply only in rare cases, where both 
parties have a stronger interest in having a single representative acting as a 
facilitator than in receiving the protections of agency law generally. The result: 
consumers would ultimately retain absolute freedom of choice as to who 
facilitates their transaction.160 
Finally, California should retain its strong disclosure and consent 
requirements within this proposed statutory structure. All of the above proposals 
presume, if not necessitate, that consumers fully contemplate whom they are 
 
 158. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. While Franchise brokerage firms are now commonplace, 
many “independent” Brokers still choose to hang their own “shingle.” The process of self-designation allows 
for the legal separation of Managing Broker and Real Estate Agent, while still allowing persons acting as 
Managing Brokers to represent their own clients if they so choose. 
 159. See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-10-402(8), 12-10-407 (West 2019); FLA. STAT. ANN. 
§ 475.278(1)(a) (West 2019); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-30,102(u) (West 2019). Akin to a Transaction Broker. 
 160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (AM. L. INST. 2018). 
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choosing to represent them and the legal ramifications of that choice. Real Estate 
Agents and their Managing Brokers should be obligated to inform clients about 
the nature of these complex legal relationships, and should alert clients when 
this relationship status changes.161 While this proposal is an incomplete 
resolution to consumer concerns regarding dual agency, California’s strict 
disclosure requirements still serve an important function by educating and 
protecting buyers and sellers throughout a complicated transaction process. 
B.  BENEFITS OF PROPOSAL 
This proposal resolves the following consumer concerns about dual 
agency. First, it clarifies statutory language and resolves the conceptual divide 
between consumers and statutory law. One of its desirable aspects is to create a 
legislative framework that is both sensible and understandable to consumers at 
large, while still functioning effectively as statutory law. Without this clarity, 
California risks further confusing and frustrating laypersons and their interests. 
Second, the proposal focuses statutory law in the direction the public truly cares 
about—toward the individual actively engaged in the transaction. Finally, the 
proposal successfully synthesizes two major consumer interests: full agency law 
protections and freedom of choice. That is, the proposal provides for agency 
protections in almost all cases, while still allowing buyers and sellers to forego 
those protections if desired. While the law should not continue to endorse the 
notion that fiduciary duties are somehow compatible with dual agency, clients 
ultimately deserve to make their own determinations about who represents them 
in a real estate transaction. 
C.  ISSUES NOT ADDRESSED BY THIS PROPOSAL 
Although the proposal outlined in this Note addresses many prominent 
consumer concerns, its scope is limited. First, it does not resolve all potential 
conflicts of interest within the real estate practice. Just as agency law itself is 
fallible, this proposal too is fallible if professionals abuse the system and their 
perceived roles within it. Agency law carries a strong presumption, but only a 
presumption, that an agent will actually endeavor to represent the client above 
his or her own interests.162 
Second, this proposal presumes, for simplicity’s sake, that the Managing 
Broker always knowingly designates a Real Estate Agent to represent a 
particular client. In practice, as a “small business,”163 each Real Estate Agent is 
likely to form relationships with buyers and sellers without the Managing 
Broker’s immediate awareness.164 In those cases, the Real Estate Agent will be 
required, in some sense, to designate himself or herself as Real Estate Agent on 
 
 161. See supra Part II. 
 162. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 22, at 73 (describing the practice of “self-dealing”). 
 163. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
 164. Cf. supra notes 45, 142 and accompanying text. 
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the Managing Broker’s behalf, and presumably receive later approval from the 
Managing Broker. While this Note does not address the relationship between 
Managing Broker and Real Estate Agent, California should closely consider how 
the two positions interact both in theory and in practice. 
Third, this Note does not consider liability ramifications of removing 
fiduciary responsibilities from the Managing Broker and placing them entirely 
on the Real Estate Agent. Certainly, a grant of fiduciary responsibility to the 
Real Estate Agent is not intended to waive all of the Managing Broker’s 
obligations to clients represented by that Managing Broker’s selected Real 
Estate Agent. This Note advocates more consumer protections, not less, and the 
Managing Broker should not be relieved from all liability if the Real Estate 
Agent acts inappropriately or the Managing Broker biases his or her actions 
toward one client over another. Perhaps the Managing Broker can be given lesser 
duties to ensure that his or her Real Estate Agents comply with high ethical 
standards, thus indirectly providing assurances to each client in the transaction. 
These factors and their potential ramifications should be considered in 
subsequent literature or by legislators when drafting this proposal into law. This 
proposal attempts to provide clarity to a confusing industry by sensibly 
redefining agency relationships, streamlining communication between 
lawmakers and law-seekers, and resolving fiduciary conflicts without 
eliminating dual agency altogether. Adoption of this proposal should continue 
to emphasize and promote those goals. 
CONCLUSION 
In the age of Franchise brokerage firms and “small business” Salespersons, 
California statutory law has become outmoded, inefficient, and out of step with 
modern practices and the consumer’s understanding of the residential real estate 
industry. Fortunately, the groundwork has already been laid for much-needed 
reform. California legislators now have an opportunity to assume a pioneering 
role and reshape real estate practices for the better. 
 
